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Abstract	
A	 descriptive	 name	 is	 a	 name	 whose	 reference	 is	 exclusively	 fixed	 by	 a	 definite	
description.	In	using	a	descriptive	name,	we	have	a	descriptive	thought	that	contains,	as	
its	component,	the	general	concept	expressed	by	the	name’s	reference‐fixing	description.	
However,	 I	 believe	 that	 in	 using	 a	 descriptive	 name,	 we	 sometimes	 have	 a	 singular	
thought,	 or	 a	 thought	 that	 does	 not	 comprise	 such	 a	 general	 concept	 but	 in	 fact	
comprises	 the	 name’s	 referent	 itself.	 To	 support	 my	 view	 I	 will	 first	 survey	 two	
prominent	 theories	on	 this	 issue―Acquaintance	Theory	and	Semantic	 Instrumentalism.	
Acquaintance	Theory	claims	that	in	order	to	have	a	singular	thought,	we	must	first	have	
an	acquaintance	relation	to	the	object	in	question.	This	means	that	in	using	a	descriptive	
name,	 we	 can	 never	 have	 a	 singular	 thought	 about	 its	 referent.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
Semantic	 Instrumentalism	maintains	 that	 by	 simply	 using	 a	 descriptive	 name,	 we	 can	
always	have	such	a	singular	thought,	regardless	of	whether	the	very	referent	exists	or	not.	
In	 my	 opinion,	 the	 former	 idea	 is	 wrong	 in	 taking	 an	 acquaintance	 relation	 itself	 as	 a	
necessary	condition	for	our	grasp	of	singular	thoughts,	and	the	latter	idea	is	implausible	in	
that	 it	 cannot	 offer	 any	 tenable	 grouping	 of	 singular	 thoughts.	 Considering	 this,	 I	 will	
argue	that	it	is	our	possession	of	proper	information	that	is	really	essential	to	our	grasp	
of	such	a	thought,	and	we	inevitably	rely	on	our	linguistic	and	social	activities	to	obtain	
the	appropriate	kind	of	information.	
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1.		Introduction	
Suppose	I	wish	to	own	a	book‐shop	one	day	and	name	the	shop	“Sunny	Sides.”	This	
name	would	 refer	 to	whatever	 uniquely	 satisfies	 the	 description	 “the	 book‐shop	 that	 I	
own.”	 “Sunny	 Sides”	 is	 a	 typical	 descriptive	 name,	 or	 a	 name	 whose	 reference	 is	
exclusively	fixed	by	a	definite	description1.	Moreover,	it	is	generally	believed	that	in	using	
a	descriptive	name,	we	have	a	descriptive	thought	that	comprises,	as	its	component,	the	
general	 concept	 expressed	 by	 the	 name’s	 reference‐fixing	 description2.	 However,	 I	
                                                    
1	Famous	examples	of	actual	descriptive	names	include	“Unabomber,”	which	will	be	discussed	later,	and	“Vulcan,”	which	
referred	to	the	planet	that	was	assumed	to	be	circling	inside	Mercury’s	orbit.	Examples	of	theoretical	descriptive	names	
include	“Julius,”	which	refers	to	the	inventor	of	the	zip	(Evans	(1982),	(1985b)),	and	“Newman	1,”	which	refers	to	the	first	
baby	born	in	the	21st	century	(Kaplan	(1989a)),	etc.	
2	Gareth	 Evans	 evidently	 supports	 this	 conclusion	 (Evans	 (1985b))	 despite	 offering	 detailed	 arguments	 that	 seem	 to	
provide	strong	grounds	against	 it	 (Evans	(1982),	 (1985a)).	My	discussion	 in	 this	paper	draws	considerably	 from	those	
arguments,	which	claim	that	it	 is	our	possession	of	information	derived	from	the	relevant	object	 that	plays	an	essential	
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propose	 that	 in	 using	 a	 descriptive	 name,	we	 sometimes	 have	 a	 singular	 thought,	 or	 a	
thought	 that	 does	 not	 comprise	 a	 general	 concept	 but	 the	 name’s	 referent	 itself.	 This	
paper	will	 support	 this	view	and	clarify	how	we	can	arrive	at	a	 singular	 thought	while	
using	a	descriptive	name.	
	
2.		Preliminary	Discussions	
2.	1.		Two	theories	considered	
To	 have	 a	 singular	 thought	 about	 an	 object	 is	 to	 think	 about	 the	 very	 object	 in	
question.	This	characterization	implies	that	in	order	to	have	a	singular	thought,	we	have	
to	think	of	an	object	in	a	very	distinct	way	without	thinking	of	it	as	the	unique	satisfier	of	
any	description.	Consequently,	what	are	the	conditions	required	for	us	to	have	a	singular	
thought?	 Concerning	 this,	 Robin	 Jeshion	 once	 pointed	 out	 two	 extreme	 positions	 and	
argued	that	one	of	them	claimed	too	strong	a	condition	for	our	having	a	singular	thought	
about	an	object,	and	the	other	too	weak	a	one3.	To	begin	with,	I	would	like	to	give	a	brief	
overview	of	 these	two	positions―Acquaintance	Theory	and	Semantic	 Instrumentalism―	
because	I	believe	that	each	of	them	does	include	something	worth	serious	consideration,	
although	they	do	not	seem	to	be	tenable	as	they	are	just	as	Jeshion	insisted.		
Acquaintance	Theory	claims	that,	in	order	to	have	a	singular	thought,	we	must	first	
have	an	acquaintance	relation	to	the	object	in	question.	This	claim	requires	that	someone	
in	our	language‐speaking	community	is	acquainted	with	the	object	and	identifies	it	as	the	
unique	 bearer	 of	 the	 name4.	 However,	 a	 descriptive	 name	 is	 a	 linguistic	 device	 that	 is	
introduced	 into	 our	 language‐speaking	 community	 without	 any	 relation	 to	 such	 an	
acquaintance	or	acquaintance‐based	identification.	The	use	of	a	descriptive	name	in	itself	
clearly	does	not	constitute	any	acquaintance	relation	between	the	user	of	 the	name	and	
the	name’s	 referent.	 If	 such	a	 relation	does	exist	 between	 the	user	of	 the	name	and	 its	
referent,	 the	 name	 would	 not	 function	 as	 a	 descriptive	 name	 but	 would	 refer	 to	 the	
relevant	object	based	on	 that	acquaintance	relation.	 In	other	words,	 its	 reference	would	
not	be	exclusively	confined	by	a	definite	description.	Thus,	Acquaintance	Theory	denies	
any	possibility	of	our	having	a	singular	 thought	about	 the	 relevant	object	while	using	a	
descriptive	 name.	 This	 position,	 which	 may	 be	 characterized	 by	 the	 slogan	 “no	
acquaintance,	no	singular	thought,”	seems	to	have	been	the	most	widely	accepted	view	in	
the	philosophy	of	language5.	
On	the	other	hand,	Semantic	Instrumentalism,	as	Jeshion	specified	it,	stands	out	by	
its	rather	liberal	attitude	toward	the	question	at	hand.	According	to	this	position,	we	can	
have	a	singular	thought	about	the	referent	of	a	descriptive	name	simply	by	using	the	very	
name,	given	some	other	minor	conditions	are	satisfied.	Indeed,	it	even	claims	that	we	can	
have	 a	 singular	 thought	 about	 an	 object	 that	 has	 not	 yet	 come	 into	 existence,	 on	 the	
condition	that	we	can	construct	and	use	a	descriptive	name	whose	reference	is	fixed	by	a	
definite	description	that	is	uniquely	satisfied	by	the	object	in	question.	Thus,	if	Semantic	
Instrumentalism	 is	 correct,	we	 can	 have	 a	 singular	 thought	 about	 any	 object	 from	 the	
past,	present,	or	 future,	as	 long	as	we	can	construct	and	use	an	appropriate	descriptive	
name,	or,	as	Jeshion	defined	it,	“descriptively	introduced	referential	terms”	(DIRTs)6.	
	
2.	2.		Singularity	of	thoughts	
According	to	Semantic	Instrumentalism,	we	can	have	a	singular	thought	simply	by	
using	 a	 descriptive	 name,	which	means	 that	 in	 using	 the	 name,	we	 can	 have	 a	 type	 of	
thought	that	cannot	be	obtained	by	thinking	of	the	referent	as	the	unique	satisfier	of	any	
description.	 Given	 that	 the	 reference	 of	 a	 descriptive	 name	 is	 exclusively	 fixed	 by	 a	
                                                                                                                                                     
role	in	our	grasp	of	a	singular	thought.	
3	Cf.	Jeshion	(2010).	
4	Cf.	Jeshion	(2010),	p.	109.	
5	For	example,	Bach	(2008),	Evans	(1985b),	McCulloch	(1985),	Recanati	(2010),	etc.	
6	DIRTs	 are	 a	 group	 of	 linguistic	 devices	 whose	 references	 are	 exclusively	 fixed	 by	 a	 definite	 description	 (cf.	 Jeshion	
(2010),	 p.	 105).	 Instead	 of	 proper	 descriptive	 names,	 those	 terms	 include	 Kaplan’s	 so‐called	 “dthat”	 expressions	 (cf.	
Kaplan	(1989a),	especially	p.	521)	and	deferred	pronouns	or	demonstratives.		
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definite	 description,	 this	 idea	 is	 rather	 problematic	 to	 support	 and	 has	 actually	 raised	
some	 powerful	 arguments	 contradicting	 it.	 For	 example,	 Evans	 (1985b)	maintains	 that	
the	sentence	“Julius	is	F”―formed	by	using	a	descriptive	name	“Julius”	whose	reference	is	
fixed	by	the	definite	description	“the	inventor	of	the	zip”―has	exactly	the	same	content	as	
the	sentence	“The	inventor	of	the	zip	is	F.”	In	other	words,	according	to	Evans,	we	come	
to	grasp	exactly	the	same	descriptive	thought	when	we	understand	these	two	sentences.	
However,	if	Semantic	Instrumentalism	is	right,	our	introduction,	and	use	of	a	descriptive	
name	 of	 itself	 should	 enable	 us	 to	 have	 a	 singular	 thought	 about	 its	 referent.	 Evans	
criticizes	this	by	saying	that	it	is	implausible	that	we	can	create	a	completely	new	type	of	
thought	 just	 by	 “the	 stroke	 of	 a	 pen.”7	However,	 I	 think	 that	 the	most	 serious	 problem	
with	Semantic	Instrumentalism	lies	in	the	fact	that	it	cannot	give	us	a	tenable	grouping	of	
singular	thoughts	in	the	first	place.	If	we	are	to	classify	a	group	of	thoughts	into	a	unified	
category,	 that	 categorization	 should	 be	 related	 to	 some	 distinctive	 character	 of	 our	
behavior	 and	 psychology,	 which	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 underlying	 thoughts	 of	 that	
category.	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 distinctive	 character	 of	 our	 behavior	 and	
psychology	which	is	observed	in	all	the	cases	of	our	use	of	a	descriptive	name,	that	is,	in	
all	the	cases	of	our	having	a	“singular	thought”	as	Semantic	Instrumentalism	calls	it.	For	
example,	 my	 behavior	 and	 psychology	 when	 using	 “Sunny	 Sides”	 in	 the	 situation	
described	above,	will	be	quite	different	 from	when	I	use	the	name	after	 I	actually	open	
the	book‐shop.	 It	 is	essential	 that	we	acknowledge	 this	difference	 if	we	are	 to	correctly	
understand	my	use	of	the	name	“Sunny	Sides”	in	each	situation.	The	concept	of	thought	is	
primarily	connected	to	this	kind	of	difference,	which	shows	how	we	understand	the	term	
in	question.	However,	we	will	end	up	cutting	off	that	connection	if	we	conclude,	according	
to	 Semantic	 Instrumentalism,	 that	 I	 have	 exactly	 the	 same	 “singular	 thought”	 in	 both	
situations.	As	far	as	I	can	see,	our	idea	of	singular	thought	as	a	thought	about	a	particular	
object	 entails	 that	 an	 object	 does,	 or	 did,	 exist.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	
singularity	 of	 thought,	 as	 we	 understand	 it,	 depends	 on	 there	 being	 a	 substantial	
connection	between	the	subject	and	the	object	that	can	be	manifested	as	a	change	in	the	
subject’s	state	of	knowledge	according	to	the	object’s	state	of	affairs.	Of	course,	we	cannot	
expect	 any	 non‐existent	 object	 to	 have	 such	 a	 causal	 effect	 on	 the	 subject’s	 state	 of	
knowledge.	 This	 clearly	 has	 something	 to	 do	 with	 the	 difference	 of	 my	 behavior	 and	
psychology	observed	in	the	two	cases	of	my	use	of	“Sunny	Sides”	mentioned	above.	Given	
all	 this,	 our	 grasp	 of	 singular	 thoughts,	 or	 thoughts	 about	 a	 particular	 object,	 cannot	
simply	 depend	 on	 our	 action	 or	 manipulation,	 such	 as	 our	 use	 of	 descriptive	 names.	
Rather,	 it	must	be	 a	matter	of	 that	 substantial	 connection	between	 the	 subject	 and	 the	
object,	which	 is	manifested	 as	 a	 systematic	 change	 in	 the	 subject’s	 state	 of	 knowledge,	
and	behavior	and	psychology,	based	on	the	object’s	state	of	affairs.	
Thus,	if	this	kind	of	connection	always	requires	the	subject	to	have	an	acquaintance	
relation	 to	 the	 object	 in	 question,	 we	 will	 be	 forced	 to	 conclude	 that	 our	 use	 of	 a	
descriptive	name	can	never	involve	our	grasp	of	singular	thoughts	about	the	referent	of	
that	 name.	 In	 my	 opinion,	 however,	 the	 connection	 cannot	 be	 constituted	 by	 the	
acquaintance	relation	itself.	Certainly,	 if	 the	acquaintance	relation	does	hold	between	the	
subject	 and	 the	 object,	 there	 must	 be,	 or	 have	 been,	 an	 object	 to	 be	 thought	 about	
anyway.	 In	 addition,	 if	 the	 subject	 himself	 is	 currently	 perceiving	 the	 object,	 or	
remembering	his	own	experience	of	having	perceived	it,	we	may	be	allowed	to	say	that	
the	 subject	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 object	 in	 the	 manner	 required	 for	 having	 a	 singular	
thought	 about	 it.	However,	 as	 Jeshion	argued,	when	 the	 subject	 is	 acquainted	with	 the	
object	via	a	communication	chain,	that	is,	on	the	basis	of	some	other	person’s	experience	
of	having	perceived	the	object,	it	is	difficult	to	explain	how	the	subject	can	have	a	singular	
thought	(if	any)	about	the	object,	given	that	our	experience	can	never	be	transferred	to	
another	 person8.	 An	 acquaintance	 relation	 that	 extends	 between	 the	 subject	 and	 the	
                                                    
7	Cf.	Evans	(1985b),	pp.	200‐202.	
8	Cf.	Jeshion	(2010),	p.	110.	
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object	 as	 long	 as	 someone	 in	 the	 relevant	 community	 has	 perceived	 the	 object	 and	
identified	it	as	a	unique	bearer	of	the	name	in	question,	seems	to	give	us	a	merely	partial	
explanation	of	how	to	grasp	a	singular	thought	about	that	object.	
If	 such	a	 connection	actually	extends	between	 the	 subject	 and	 the	object,	we	 can	
expect	the	subject’s	state	of	knowledge	to	change	according	to	the	object’s	state	of	affairs.	
From	 time	 to	 time,	 such	 a	 connection	 is	 sustained	 because	 of	 a	 communication	 chain	
between	 the	 subject	 and	 the	 object,	 even	 if	 the	 subject	 has	 not	 perceived	 the	 object	
himself.	For	example,	we	can	gain	information	about	the	words	and	actions	of	a	person	
we	have	 never	met	 through	 communicating	with	 others.	 Based	on	 that	 knowledge,	we	
often	form	a	certain	opinion	about	the	person,	which	will	naturally	change	as	we	acquire	
more	 information	about	him.	This	 observation	suggests	 that	what	 constitutes	 a	proper	
connection	and	makes	our	thought	a	singular	thought	about	a	particular	object,	is	not	any	
perceptual	 experience	 of	 that	 object	 by	 someone	 in	 the	 relevant	 community,	 nor	 any	
acquaintance	relation	which	originates	 from	that	perceptual	experience	 for	 that	matter.	
Rather,	 it	 is	 information	 that	 is	 often	 received	 from	 the	 object	 and	 transferred	 to	 the	
subject	 through	 an	 acquaintance	 relation	 that	 constitutes	 the	 required	 substantial	
connection	 between	 the	 subject	 and	 the	 object9.	 This	 type	 of	 information,	 unlike	
perceptual	 experience,	 can	 certainly	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	 subject	 who	 has	 never	
perceived	 the	 object	 through	 a	 communication	 chain	 as	 mentioned	 above.	 It	 is	 quite	
remarkable	to	see	the	power	of	that	substantial	connection,	of	affecting	the	subject’s	state	
of	knowledge,	ultimately	consisting	 in	this	 type	of	 information	that	 is	 transferred	to	the	
subject	 and	 sometimes	updated.	Moreover,	 this	 information	 is	not	necessarily	 obtained	
by	someone’s	perceptual	experience	of	 the	object	 in	question,	but	can	be	derived	 from	
the	works	 created	 by	 the	 object,	 or	 historical	material	 that	 tells	 us	 about	 the	 object’s	
words	 or	 actions.	 If	 all	 these	 considerations	 are	 correct,	we	 can	 say	 that	 Acquaintance	
Theory	has	identified	the	means	to	receive	and	transmit	this	type	of	information,	that	is,	a	
perceptual	 experience	 of	 the	 object	 in	 question	 and	 an	 acquaintance	 relation	 that	
originates	from	such	an	experience.	However,	as	I	see	it,	to	have	a	singular	thought	about	
an	object	is	to	acquire	information	from	the	very	object	itself,	and	that	is	quite	different	
from	 having	 an	 acquaintance	 relation	 to	 the	 object	 in	 question	 through	which	we	 can	
sometimes	receive	or	transmit	information.	
	
3.		Case	Studies	
3.	1.		Recapitulation	and	ensuing	deductions	
Once	again,	what	is	essential	to	having	a	singular	thought	about	a	particular	object	
is,	in	my	opinion,	a	precise	connection	to	the	object	in	question.	Moreover,	if	I	am	right	in	
my	assumption	that	this	kind	of	connection	does	not	depend	on	having	an	acquaintance	
relation	 to	 the	 relevant	 object,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 no	 obstacle	 for	 sustaining	 such	 a	
connection	between	the	user	of	a	descriptive	name	and	the	name’s	referent	as	long	as	the	
referent	really	exists,	or	existed.	In	this	section,	I	would	like	to	examine	some	real	cases	of	
our	use	of	a	descriptive	name,	and	clarify	in	more	detail	how	such	an	exercise	can	involve	
our	grasp	of	a	singular	thought	of	the	relevant	object.	
	
3.	2.		Two	cases	considered	
The	 first	 case	 we	 shall	 deal	 with	 is	 one	 where	 the	 descriptive	 name	 has,	 as	 its	
referent,	an	object	that	actually	exists,	or	existed.	However,	even	an	examination	of	such	a	
case	 cannot	 conclude	 that	 all	 such	 cases	 of	 our	 use	 of	 a	 descriptive	 name	 involve	 our	
grasp	 of	 a	 singular	 thought	 about	 its	 referent.	 For	 example,	 let	 us	 now	 introduce	 a	
descriptive	name	“Conan”	by	means	of	fixing	its	reference	through	the	definite	description	
“the	 last	 Naumann’s	 elephant	 which	 lived	 in	 Hokkaido.”	 This	 descriptive	 name	 clearly	
satisfies	the	condition	that	it	has,	as	its	referent,	an	object	that	must	have	really	existed	in	
Hokkaido.	However,	given	the	arguments	in	the	previous	section,	it	is	difficult	to	contend	
                                                    
9	Cf.	Evans	(1982),	(1985a)	and	footnote	2.	
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that	we	can	arrive	at	a	singular	thought	about	Conan	in	using	“Conan,”	because	we	do	not	
have	any	information,	which	can	claim	to	have	received	from	that	particular	Naumann’s	
elephant.	 Thus,	 we	 are	 not	 connected	 to	 Conan	 in	 the	 manner	 required	 for	 having	 a	
singular	thought	about	it.	This	means	that	our	state	of	knowledge,	and	our	behavior	and	
psychology	cannot	be	affected	by	Conan’s	state	of	affairs.	At	most,	we	can	conclude	that,	
in	using	“Conan,”	we	have	a	general	thought,	which	involves	a	general	concept	expressed	
by	the	name’s	reference‐fixing	description.	In	this	type	of	case,	where	a	descriptive	name	
is	 introduced	 in	 an	 entirely	 ad‐hoc	 manner,	 we	 can	 naturally	 conclude	 that	 in	 using	 a	
descriptive	 name	we	 can	 never	 arrive	 at	 a	 singular	 thought	 about	 its	 referent.	 Indeed,	
some	influential	discussions	about	the	relation	between	our	use	of	descriptive	names	and	
singular	thoughts	have	focused	on	this	type	of	ad‐hoc	descriptive	names10.	
However,	there	is	another	type	of	case	where	the	user	of	a	descriptive	name	has	a	
more	substantial	knowledge	about	the	referent.	One	example	is	the	use	of	the	descriptive	
name	 “Unabomber”	 before	 its	 referent	 was	 identified.	 This	 descriptive	 name	 was	
introduced	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 person	 responsible	 for	 the	 serial	 bombings	 that	 occurred	
between	the	late	1970s	and	the	1990s	in	the	United	States	of	America.	The	Unabomber,	
later	 identified	 as	 Theodore	Kaczynski,	 repeated	 the	 offense	 16	 times,	 targeting	 airline	
companies	and	universities,	until	his	arrest	 in	1996.	He	even	claimed	responsibility	 for	
the	bombings	through	a	leading	newspaper.	Naturally,	people	who	lived	in	the	USA	at	that	
time	must	have	used	the	name	“Unabomber”	while	discussing	his	character,	actions,	and	
motives,	even	before	he	was	actually	identified.	It	is	not	too	difficult	to	believe	that	some	
of	them	might	have	even	refrained	from	visiting	airports	or	universities	because	of	such	
conversations.	As	 far	 as	 I	 can	 see,	we	 essentially	 behave	 the	 same	way	with	 regard	 to	
people	who	 have	 already	 been	 identified	 in	 our	 language‐speaking	 community,	 such	 as	
Abraham	 Lincoln	 or	 Adolf	 Hitler.	 We	 discuss	 their	 personalities	 or	 influences,	 express	
various	 emotions	 toward	 their	 behavior,	 and	 decide	 to	 adopt	 or	 avoid	 a	 certain	 action	
based	on	such	discussions	or	emotions.	Of	course,	the	point	here	is	that	in	both	cases	the	
subject’s	behavior	and	psychology	seem	to	be	significantly	affected	by	information	about	
a	certain	object,	which	the	subject	himself	has	never	perceived.	Not	only	in	the	latter	case	
where	an	object	has	already	been	identified	as	the	bearer	of	the	name	at	hand,	but	also	in	
the	 former	 case	 where	 such	 an	 identification	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 made,	 the	 subject	 seems	 to	
receive	 information	 from	 the	 relevant	 object	 and,	 therefore,	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 have	 a	
singular	thought	about	it11.	
	
3.	3.		Non	ad‐hoc	or	“information‐based”	use	of	descriptive	names	
In	using	a	descriptive	name,	 if	we	compare	the	way	“Unabomber”	was	introduced	
and	used	with	the	way	“Conan”	was,	we	will	observe	a	distinctive	feature,	which	seems	to	
play	a	crucial	role	in	our	grasp	of	a	singular	thought	about	the	relevant	object.	Mainly,	our	
positive	involvement	in	collecting	and	communicating	information	derived	from	the	very	
object	 by	 using	 the	 exact	 name.	 “Unabomber”	 was	 first	 introduced	 into	 the	 relevant	
community	against	a	very	different	background	 from	the	case	of	 “Conan,”	 in	 that,	 from	
the	outset,	the	name	“Unabomber”	was	linked	with	information	derived	from	its	referent	
since	the	police	must	have	obtained	some	information	from	the	Unabomber	during	their	
investigation.	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 exactly	 because	 such	 information	 had	 been	 obtained	 that	
they	introduced	the	descriptive	name	“Unabomber.”	In	other	words,	“Unabomber,”	unlike	
“Conan,”	was	not	introduced	into	the	relevant	community	in	an	ad‐hoc	manner.	Rather,	it	
was	 introduced	 in	connection	with	some	information	 from	its	referent	 in	 the	 first	place	
with	 the	 intention	 of	 being	used	 to	 collect	 and	 communicate	 relevant	 information	 that	
would	be	accumulated	and	updated	as	 time	went	by.	When	 the	name	became	common	
knowledge	 in	the	community,	 information	from	the	Unabomber	also	was	transferred	by	
                                                    
10	“Julius”	and	“Newman	1”	mentioned	in	footnote	1	are	typical	examples	of	ad‐hoc	descriptive	names.	
11	As	was	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	identification	of	the	object	in	question,	or	an	acquaintance	relation	between	
the	subject	and	the	object	based	on	such	an	identification,	is	different	from	the	subject’s	possession	of	information	from	
the	very	object.	
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using	the	name	more	widely	than	ever	before.	This	strikingly	contrasts	with	the	case	of	
“Conan,”	 whose	 use	 was	 a	 completely	 personal	 matter	 and	 did	 not	 amount	 to	 any	
collection	and	communication	of	information	from	its	referent.	In	short,	our	introduction	
and	use	of	“Conan”	had	nothing	to	do	with	our	collecting	and	communicating	information	
from	the	 relevant	object,	which	should	be	characterized	as	an	essentially	 linguistic	and	
social	activity.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 introduction	and	use	of	 “Unabomber”	was	 indeed	
related	to	that	kind	of	activity,	and	the	fact	that	it	actually	provided	people	with	the	right	
kind	 of	 information,	 was	 ultimately	 responsible	 for	 their	 grasp	 of	 a	 singular	 thought	
about	 the	 Unabomber.	 Of	 course,	 information	 that	 was	 communicated	 using	
“Unabomber”	may	have	included	those	that	did	not	originate	from	the	Unabomber	at	all.	
If	no	information	from	him	had	been	included,	then,	while	using	the	descriptive	name,	the	
subject	could	have	grasped	no	singular	thought	about	the	Unabomber.	In	reality,	however,	
more	 and	 more	 information	 from	 the	 Unabomber	 came	 to	 be	 connected	 with	
“Unabomber”	 as	 he	 repeated	 offenses.	 This	 is	 crucial	 for	 people	 to	 have	 a	 singular	
thought	about	him,	given	that	their	possession	of	such	information	plays	an	essential	role	
in	their	grasp	of	such	a	singular	thought.	The	subject	who	did	obtain	some	information	
from	the	Unabomber	must	have	been	able	 to	grasp	a	singular	 thought	about	him	while	
using	“Unabomber,”	even	if	he	connected	other	 information	that	did	not	originate	 from	
the	Unabomber	with	 “Unabomber”.	 If	 the	 subject	 found	 some	 incorrect	 information	 in	
connection	to	“Unabomber,”	he	would	have	immediately	discarded	it.	This	suggests	that	it	
was	only	 information	 from	the	Unabomber	 that	 could	affect	 the	subject’s	behavior	and	
psychology.	Thus,	only	 the	Unabomber	could	be	 connected	 to	 the	subject	 in	a	way	 that	
characterized	the	grasp	of	a	singular	thought	about	a	particular	object.	
	
4.		Concluding	Remarks	
If	 all	 these	 considerations	 are	 on	 the	 right	 track,	 it	 follows	 that	 our	 use	 of	
descriptive	names,	which	 is	meant	 to	be	a	 linguistic	and	social	activity	 like	 the	example	
given	 above,	 can	 actually	 widen	 the	 range	 of	 objects	 of	 which	 we	 can	 have	 a	 singular	
thought.	 If	 that	 is	 the	case,	 it	 follows	that	descriptive	names	are	uniquely	 important	for	
our	having	a	singular	thought	about	a	variety	of	objects	that	exist	or	existed	throughout	
the	world.	 In	 fact,	 the	 following	passage	 suggests	 that	 a	more	 or	 less	 similar	 view	may	
underlie	Semantic	Instrumentalism.	
	
“…The	notion	that	a	referent	can	be	carried	by	a	name	from	early	past	to	present	suggests	
that	the	language	itself	carries	meanings,	and	thus	that	we	can	acquire	meanings	through	
the	 instrument	of	 language.	This	 frees	us	 from	 the	constraints	of	 subjectivist	 semantics	
and	provides	the	opportunity	for	an	instrumental	use	of	language	to	broaden	the	realm	of	
what	can	be	expressed	and	to	broaden	the	horizons	of	thought	itself.	/	On	my	view,	our	
connection	 with	 a	 linguistic	 community	 in	 which	 names	 and	 other	 meaning‐bearing	
elements	 are	 passed	 down	 to	 us	 enables	 us	 to	 entertain	 thoughts	 through	the	language	
that	would	not	otherwise	be	accessible	to	us.	Call	this	the	Instrumental	Thesis.	/	…It	urges	
us	to	see	language,	and	in	particular	semantics,	as	more	autonomous,	more	independent	
of	 the	 thought	 of	 individual	 users,	 and	 to	 see	 our	 powers	 of	 apprehension	 as	 less	
autonomous	and	more	dependent	on	our	vocabulary.”12	
	
Of	 course,	 Semantic	 Instrumentalism	 emphasizes	 the	 point	 that	 our	 use	 of	 a	
descriptive	name	of	itself	allows	us	to	grasp	a	singular	thought	about	its	referent.	However,	
the	passage	cited	above	clearly	requires	us	to	be	connected	to	some	or	other	 language‐
speaking	community	in	order	to	grasp	such	a	thought.	The	problem,	 in	my	view,	is	that	
Semantic	Instrumentalism	has	 interpreted	this	connection	as	having	nothing	to	do	with	
our	linguistic	and	social	activity	discussed	above,	which	is	collecting	and	communicating	
information	from	the	relevant	object.	If	my	arguments	so	far	are	correct,	we	are	forced	to	
                                                    
12	Kaplan	(1989b),	pp.	603‐604.	
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conclude	that,	even	in	the	case	of	an	ordinary	proper	name	from	which	the	passage	starts	
its	 consideration,	 our	 receiving	 and	 holding	 information	 from	 the	 referent	 is	 what	 is	
essential	for	us	to	have	a	singular	thought	about	it.	This	information	is	often	transferred	
to	us	through	the	linguistic	and	social	activity	carried	out	by	using	the	very	name.	Thus,	
Semantic	 Instrumentalism	 makes	 a	 good	 point	 in	 stating	 that	 our	 use	 of	 descriptive	
names	against	a	background	of	some	language‐speaking	community	would	enable	us	to	
have	a	singular	thought	that	would	otherwise	not	be	accessible	to	us.	However,	it	would	
be	a	grave	error	to	conclude	that	our	use	of	descriptive	names	quite	generally	enables	us	
to	have	a	singular	thought	about	its	referent,	regardless	of	whether	the	use	is	related	to	
any	linguistic	and	social	activity.	
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